Abstract-RFID tags are being widely employed in a variety of applications, ranging from barcode replacement to electronic passports. Their extensive use, however, in combination with their wireless nature, introduces privacy concerns as a tag could leak information about the owner's behaviour. In this paper we define two privacy notions, unlinkability and forward privacy, using a formal model based on the applied pi calculus, and we show the relationship between them. Then we focus on a generic class of simple privacy protocols, giving sufficient and necessary conditions for unlinkability and forward privacy for this class. These conditions are based on the concept of frame independence that we develop in this paper. Finally, we apply our techniques to two identification protocols, formally proving their privacy guarantees.
I. INTRODUCTION Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems are wireless technology for automatic identification consisting of a set of tags, readers and a backend. The tags are typically very simple devices consisting of a tiny chip and an antenna offering very limited resources. The readers are connected with the backend which stores the valuable information about the tags. The tags interact with the readers through identification protocols which aim to get the identity of the tag to the backend system in a secure manner.
The wireless nature of RFID makes access to tags extremely easy. They are commonly used, for example, in supply chain management and are starting to make their way into the consumer realm. One of the main issues that needs to be addressed to make this possible it that of privacy: the fact that access to the tags is so easy also introduces the potential of misuse. The tag's ease of access allows them to be easily analyzed by the attacker. Also, as the tag may travel with its owner, its location is already sensitive information, thus an attack which does not identify a tag but does distinguish it from other tags is already a problem. Finally, the resource constraints of the tags mean that many security protocols cannot be used by the tag since it cannot perform computational intensive cryptographic operations.
The problems identified lead to security goals of unlinkability and forward privacy for identification protocols. Unlinkability states that an attacker is not able to trace the movement of a tag, i.e. observing past events should not allow an attacker to distinguish between tags. The stronger goal of forward privacy in turn becomes important when the attacker may obtain the tag in question, e.g. by stealing it or even simply buying the item it is attached to. As the tags are simple devices, the attacker can likely break the tag to obtain any information stored in it. Still, this should not enable the attacker to trace the tag in retrospect, i.e. to learn its past locations.
Because of the resource constraints of the tags, hash functions, which are arguably easy to compute, often play an important role in the identification protocols. Consider, for example, the simple but effective OSK protocol ( [1] ), displayed in Figure 1 . It assumes that a tag can compute two distinct one-way hash functions h and g. Each tag initially stores a secret s which it shares with the backend. The hash function h is used to update the secret at each run of the protocol while g is used to 'encrypt' the output; the tag sends g(s i ), where s i is its current secret and then updates its secret s i+1 = h(s i ). Intuitively this protocol meets our security goals; the function g ensures that the output of the tag looks random, thus untraceable, and updating the secret with h ensures that no past secrets or interactions can be found if the tag is broken and secret s i+1 is obtained by the attacker. But proving this fact formally is a challenging task.
In this paper we introduce a formal model for RFID privacy, expressing unlinkability and forward privacy as equivalences in the applied pi calculus, and we show that forward privacy is stronger. We then study a generic class P, Q, R ::= plain processes 0 null process P | Q parallel composition !P replication νn.P restriction if M = N then P else Q conditional u(x).P message input u N .P message output
A, B, C ::= extended processes P plain process A | B parallel composition νn.A name restriction νx.A variable restriction { M / x } active substitution Figure 2 . Syntax of the applied pi calculus of single step protocols, giving necessary and sufficient conditions for both properties. These conditions are based on the notion of frame independence that we develop in Section IV. These results are then employed to prove the privacy properties of the OSK protocol mentioned above, as well as another protocol from the literature. We also show how alterations to this protocol cause flaws, breaking forward privacy or even unlinkability. We conclude with related and future work. The proof of all results is given in the report version of this paper ( [2] ).
II. THE APPLIED PI CALCULUS
The applied pi calculus ( [3] ) is a language for describing concurrent processes and their interaction. It extends the pi calculus ( [4] ) adding the possibility to model cryptographic primitives through a signature and an equational theory. In this section we briefly recall its basic notions, for an extended description see [3] .
The syntax consists of terms, plain processes and extended processes. A term is a name (a, b, c, . . .), a variable (x, y, z) or a function application f (M 1 , . . . , M l ), where f is a function symbol from a signature Σ, M 1 , . . . , M l are terms and l is the arity of f . Metavariables u, v, w are used for both names and variables. We denote by n, x, M a (possibly empty) sequence of names, variables and terms respectively. We write M N iff M is a subterm of N and M N iff M N and M = N . We also denote by M [ N / x ] the term obtained by substituting N for x in M .
The syntax of processes is shown in Fig. 2 . We have the standard primitives from the π-calculus together with ifthen-else and the possibility to output terms, instead of simple names. Processes are extended with active substitutions which replace variables with terms, modelling information known to the environment. We use f n(P ), f v(P ) to denote the free names and variables of P , with restriction and input being considered binders. An extended process is closed when its variables are bound or defined by an active substitution. Finally, frames ranged over by ψ and ϕ, are extended processes built up from 0 and active substitutions of the form { M / x } by parallel composition and restriction. A frame is in canonical form iff ϕ = ν n.{ M / x } where f v( M ) = ∅ and { n} ⊆ f n( M ). The set { x} is called the domain of ϕ, written dom(ϕ).
The signature Σ is equipped with an equational theory, i.e. an equivalence relation = E on terms that is closed under substitution of terms for variables. We also require = E to be closed under one-to-one substitution of names.
The signature together with the equational theory are used to model cryptographic primitives. For example, symmetric encryption can be modelled using two function symbols enc, dec together with the equation dec(enc(x, k), k) = E x. One-way hash functions can be modelled using a unary function symbol h with no equations.
The operational semantics is defined by two relations: structural equivalence and internal reduction. An evaluation context is an extended process with a hole replacing an extended sub-process. Structural equivalence ≡ is the smallest equivalence relation on extended processes that is closed by α-conversion on both names and variables, by application of evaluation contexts, and satisfying some structural rules such as associativity and commutativity of | , binding-operatorlike behaviour of ν, and:
It can be shown that any frame ϕ is structurally equivalent to a frame ϕ in canonical form. Internal reduction → is the smallest relation on extended processes closed by structural equivalence and application of evaluation contexts s.t.:
for any ground terms M and N s.t. M = E N Several properties of security protocols can be formalized in terms of observational equivalence between processes. We write A ⇓ a when A can send a message on a channel a, that is, when A → * C[ā M .P ] for some evaluation context C that does not bind a.
Definition 1: Observational equivalence (≈) is the largest symmetric relation R between closed extended processes with the same domain such that ARB implies:
for closing evaluation contexts C.
In [3] , a labeled bisimilarity ≈ l is defined and it is proved that ≈=≈ l . Labeled bisimilarity is useful in proofs, since it is much easier to handle than observational equivalence. Finally, static equivalence between frames is defined below.
Definition 2: Two terms M and N are equal in the frame ϕ, written (M = N )ϕ, iff ϕ ≡ ν n.σ, M σ = N σ, and { n} ∩ {f n(M ) ∪ f n(N )} = ∅ for some names n and substitution σ. Two closed frames ϕ, ψ are statically equivalent, written ϕ ≈ s ψ, when dom(ϕ) = dom(ψ) and when, for all terms M and N , we have (M = N )ϕ iff (M = N )ψ.
III. FORMALIZATION OF RFID PROTOCOLS AND

PROPERTIES
In this section we discuss how to formalize RFID protocols and their privacy properties in the applied pi calculus. We focus on two privacy properties, unlinkability ( [5] ), also called untraceability ( [6] , [7] ), indistinguishability ([1]) or simply privacy ( [8] ) in various contexts, and forward privacy ( [1] ). Roughly speaking, a protocol satisfies unlinkability if the adversary cannot link two sessions of the protocol to the same tag. For forward privacy, the attacker is allowed to tamper with a tag and retrieve the data stored in it. Forward privacy is satisfied if the attacker cannot use the data to link the tag to past sessions, obtained before tampering with it.
Indistinguishability games: Privacy properties are typically defined by means of games in a computational setting. Two similar types of games can be found in the literature, we follow here the nomenclature from [5] .
In the first one, called untraceability in [5] and also used in [9] , [1] , [10] , [11] , the game consists roughly of the following phases: in the beginning the adversary can eavesdrop on communications and query all the tags and the readers in the system. Then a tag is chosen randomly from the set {T 0 , T 1 } and the attacker is given access to it. She can then query {T 0 , T 1 } as well as all other tags in the system. The game ends with the adversary announcing her guess of the selected tag. The protocol satisfies untraceability if the adversary cannot detect the selected tag with probability higher than random guessing.
A slightly different type of game is used in the definition of unlinkability in [5] , also found in [8] . In this game, the attacker is given access to two tags which can be either independent or linked, meaning that by querying any of them the adversary actually interacts with the same tag. She is then allowed to query these tags as well as all the other tags and readers in the system. Unlinkability is satisfied if the adversary cannot distinguish the two cases with probability higher than random guessing.
Our definition, given in Section III-B, is inspired by the second approach. In our model, tags communicate with the environment through a tag interface. A protocol satisfies unlinkability if, given two interfaces that she can freely query, the attacker cannot distinguish whether they correspond to the same or different tags. Similar games can be also defined for forward privacy.
A. Modelling RFID protocols in the applied pi calculus
The applied pi calculus provides an elegant framework for modelling security protocols, as it allows to specify both the interaction between the various agents, using the communication primitives of the calculus, as well as the cryptographic operations, using a suitable equational theory. In this section we discuss the characteristic features of RFID protocols and how to model them in the applied pi calculus.
An RFID system typically consists of several tags and one or more readers. The readers might also communicate with a centralized backend database, typically through a secure channel. An important property of most RFID protocols is that they are stateful, usually as a means to provide the same functionality to a stateless protocol but with simpler cryptographic primitives. Tags have an internal memory which is usually updated after each execution. Thus, in contrast to traditional stateless protocols, a tag's output can be different on each execution, even without the use of randomly generated nonces. Since all tags execute the same code, they are differentiated only by their state, that is the content of their memory. Each tag typically has a unique secret s, also known to the reader (through the backend database), which distinguishes it from other tags and which allows the reader to identify it. The secret is generated either during the tag's creation or some initialization phase, and it is stored in the tag's state. After that, the secret is never transmitted by the tag in cleartext.
We model the tag's state using a process, running in parallel with the tag's main code, which can output the state's content in a channel local to the tag. For clarity, we use the process
to denote the state, where w is the restricted channel used to read the state and M is the state's content. The tag reads the state using an input w(x), and updates the state by putting back a St(w, M ) subprocess at the end of its execution.
A single tag session is modelled by a process P (w, c) that communicates with the rest of the system using two channels: first, a restricted channel w used to read or update the tag's state, as explained above. Second, a public channel c used to communicate with the reader. We refer to this channel as a tag interface.
Moreover, we assume that some tags are synchronized, so that they cannot be executed simultaneously. This assumption might appear too restrictive, but it is actually necessary to guarantee unlinkability for most protocols. The reason is explained in detail in Section III-B. Synchronization is achieved using a channel t shared between the tags, playing the role of a synchronization token. A tag gets the token with an input on t right before accessing its state, and restores the token with an output on t when it finishes its execution.
Cryptographic primitives are modelled, as usual, using a signature and an equational theory. The protocols analyzed in this paper use solely one-way hash functions. These are modelled using a unary function symbol h with no equations. As a consequence, h is one-way (cannot be inverted) and collision free. We discuss hash functions in more detail in Section IV-A. Other cryptographic primitives will require proper equations, for example dec(enc(x, k), k) = x for symmetric encryption. Several other cryptographic primitives are discussed in [3] .
Example 1: As an example, we model the OSK protocol described in the introduction. The protocol uses two hash functions, h and g, to update and "encrypt" the secret respectively. A tag session of this protocol can be modelled as follows:
We use c( ) (resp. c ) to denote an input (resp. output) on channel c when we are not interested in the transmitted value. The input on c simply triggers the execution of the protocol and corresponds to the reader asking "who are you?". Then the tag obtains the synchronization token with an input on t, reads the current content of its state with an input on its state channel w, and outputs the hash g of the current state on the public channel c. Finally, it puts a new token t and a new state St(w, h(x)) back to the system, that is in parallel to the rest of the processes. Both the token and the new state will be read at the next execution of the protocol.
So far we have modelled a single tag execution. To model a complete tag we need to initialize the state and run an unbounded number of executions. Let InitSt(w, s) be a process that initializes the tag's state, where w is the channel used to read the state and s is the unique secret of the tag. For example, the process
registers the secret to the database through a private channel n and then stores s in the state. Then a complete tag is modelled as:
T ag(c) models a tag with interface c. It can perform an unbounded number of protocol executions, starting from the initial state InitSt(w, s). We then define:
ReplT ag models an unbounded number of tags, each with its own interface. To achieve this, a new channel c is created by each replicated copy, then c is announced on the public channel an to make it available to the outside environment.
Note that we do not use synchronization for these tags: we provide each copy with its own token t, so it can be executed at any time independently from the rest of the tags. Synchronization will be actively used in the definitions of Section III-B.
Finally let Reader, DB be processes modelling the reader and the backend database, and let n contain any private channels shared between all parties (eg. used to register a tag). A complete RFID system is modelled as ν n.(ReplT ag | Reader | DB)
B. Definition of unlinkability
The idea behind our definition is inspired by the unlinkability game discussed in Section III. In our model, the attacker communicates with a tag through a tag interface. Typically, this corresponds to the attacker obtaining proximity to the tag and querying it wirelessly, but in general it can refer to any kind of access to the tag that the attacker might obtain. An interface can be queried an arbitrary number of times and each time the same tag is accessed. For example, an attacker can query a tag at the entrance of a building multiple times, always interacting with the same tag. On the other hand, multiple interfaces might provide access to the same tag. For example, an attacker might see a tag at the entrance of building A and a tag at the entrance of building B. This gives him two interfaces to communicate with a tag, however it could be either the same tag in both cases or different ones. Our definition requires that the two cases should be indistinguishable to the attacker, in other words, the attacker should not know which physical tag she is accessing each time.
As discussed in the previous section, we denote by P (w, c) the process modelling a single tag session. The channel c is a public channel that the tag uses to communicate with the environment, in other words the tag's interface. Since all tags execute the same code, they are distinguished solely by their state. Consider P (w, c 1 ) and P (w, c 2 ). Since both processes are connected to the same state, they model two executions of the same tag, but on different interfaces. This leads us to define a tag with multiple interfaces:
This process contains only one state, hence it models a single tag. On the other hand the tag contains two interfaces c 1 , c 2 . Both interfaces can be accessed to execute a protocol session an unbounded number of times. Since both interfaces access the same state, interacting with any of them at a particular moment will give the same outcome. Figure 3 shows a graphical representation of the difference between T ag(c 1 , c 2 ) and T ag(c 1 ) | T ag(c 2 ) (two independent tags).
We are now ready to state our definition of unlinkability: 
Definition 3 (Unlinkability):
We define a system context as:
A protocol satisfies unlinkability iff:
This definition requires that the adversary cannot distinguish a tag with two interfaces from two tags with one interface each. Intuitively, this means that the attacker cannot link two executions on different interfaces, since she cannot distinguish whether the interfaces correspond to the same tag or two different tags. The tags are compared in a context modelling a complete RFID system, which potentially allows the attacker to exploit information from other tags, the reader or the backend database. Note that the adversary is not modelled explicitly, but she is considered part of the environment. Observational equivalence guarantees that no environment will be able to distinguish these two cases. Note also that the two tags are synchronized on the shared channel t, the reason for this is explained in the next paragraph.
Synchronization issues: Tags can only run one protocol session at a time. This is due to the fact that the state needs to be updated before starting a new session. However, for protocols with multiple steps, this can lead to a violation of unlinkability. Consider the following scenario: an attacker starts communicating with a tag using the interface c 1 (eg. at location A). In the middle of the session she stops, leaving the tag in an intermediate state. Later she accesses a tag using a different interface c 2 (eg. at a different location B) and tries to run the protocol again. If c 2 corresponds to the same tag then the protocol cannot start since the tag is in the middle of the previous session. If it is a different tag then it can start the protocol normally. Thus, the attacker can decide whether c 1 , c 2 correspond to the same tag or not, violating unlinkability.
In practice, however, this type of attacks is usually prevented by some property of the tag that we do not want to model explicitly. For example, a passive tag (without battery) will switch off when the tag is moved away from the reader, and before the attacker is able to start a session on a different interface. Similarly, the tag might be programmed to run each session for a small amount of time, and then switch off automatically.
To prevent such attacks, we restrict our attacker model by requiring that the attacker cannot execute sessions with both T ag(c 1 ), T ag(c 2 ) at the same time: a session on the c 1 interface needs to finish before a session on c 2 can start, and vice versa. Under this restriction, Definition 3 ensures that the adversary cannot distinguish a tag running two sessions from two independent tags, provided that the two session do not overlap. Under the assumption that the attacker cannot force the two sessions to overlap (as in the attack described above), she has no way to distinguish the two cases. Note that we do not need to synchronize all tags in the system, but only the ones that create confusion to the attacker. Indeed, the tags in ReplT ag have their own private tokens thus they can be executed autonomously.
We should also point out that our definition does not really depend on the synchronization requirement. If we want to capture the attack described above, or if our protocol has a mechanism to prevent it, we can remove all occurrence of the channel t from our model, and still use Definition 3 to express unlinkability. In this case, T ag(c 1 ) | T ag(c 2 ) can always run two sessions on c 1 and c 2 in parallel, since the tags are independent. However, T ag(c 1 , c 2 ) might not be able to do so: if the first session does not update the state immediately, the second will block when it tries to read it.
Finally, note that because of ReplT ag, the definition of unlinkability involves an unbounded number of tags and interfaces. However, only two interfaces are linked to the same tag, all others provide access to different tags. This is similar to the unlinkability games in which the attacker is provided with two tags to distinguish, even though there are arbitrarily many tags in the system. A slightly different approach would be to link more interfaces together, for example we could have a single tag in the left-hand side with an unbounded number of interfaces. Studying this variation is left as future work.
Justification of various design choices: A characteristic of our definition, criticised by our reviewers, is that it is tailored to RFID systems, while a more general definition of unlinkability that could be applied to other systems would be preferable. For example, we provide each tag with a separate interface that allows the attacker to knowingly query the same tag several times. Although not present in other systems, we believe that this is an inherent property of RFID systems. Communicating with a tag requires having proximity to it. Once the attacker obtains proximity, she can perform several queries within a very short time and most certainly the same tag will reply. This is a very common scenario so we wanted to have this capability built in the model. Note also that it is not uncommon for security definitions to be dependent on the corresponding model (eg [12] ). Moreover, unlinkability is a highly overloaded term that means different things in different areas.
On the other hand, our definition could be modified to remove the ability to query a tag multiple times, while maintaining its spirit. For example, we can provide all tags (including the ones in ReplT ag) with the same interface c, and add a separate tag ST ag(c ) that can perform a single session on interface c . Then we can require that
where T ag(c, c ) is a tag that can perform an unbounded number of sessions on the common interface c and a single session on c . In this case c is a challenge session and the attacker should not be able to tell whether it is linked to another session or not.
We should also point out that our definition prevents the attacker not only from linking two specific sessions, but also from knowing that two sessions are not linked as well as from knowing that two linked sessions exist at all. This is in contrast, for example, to the definition of untraceability of [6] , which only prevents the attacker from actively linking two sessions. Whether a weaker definition is sufficient or not depends of course on the specific application. We believe however, that for protocols that do satisfy a strong property, like OSK, the strong property should be used in their analysis.
C. Definition of forward privacy
The forward privacy property is modelled in the same way as unlinkability, but the adversary is given a further ability: she is now able to break one of the two tags she is given and retrieve the information stored in its state. After that, the tag clearly becomes traceable. However, forward privacy requires that the attacker is still unable to trace protocol sessions that happened before breaking the tag. To capture this notion, once the tag is broken the interfaces c 1 , c 2 cannot be used any longer. Thus the attacker can only use information obtained in past sessions to distinguish the two cases. She can still, however, communicate with all the other tags of the system.
We define:
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Break(w) is a process that allows the attacker to read the state with channel w. The action is triggered by an input on the public channel br. Then, the token t is consumed, ensuring that any tags synchronized on t have finished their session. Consuming the token also prevents such tags from being executed in the future, since an execution will block on the attempt to read the token. Finally, the content of the state is read and sent back to the attacker on the public channel br.
BrT ag(c) models a breakable tag with a single interface c. It is similar to T ag(c) with the addition of the br action of the Break subprocess, which reveals the tag's state to the attacker and blocks the tag by consuming the token.
Finally, BrT ag(c 1 , c 2 ) models a breakable tag with two interfaces. It is similar to T ag(c 1 , c 2 ) with the addition of the br action. Similarly to BrT ag(c), once br is triggered the content of the state is revealed to the attacker and both interfaces are blocked.
We can now state the definition of forward privacy. Definition 4 (Forward Privacy): A protocol satisfies forward privacy iff
where C[ ] is the system context of Definition 3. The definition is similar to the one of unlinkability: an adversary should not be able to distinguish a tag with two interfaces from two separate tags. The difference is the possibility to break one of the tags and read its state, but without querying the two tags any longer.
Intuitively, forward privacy is a stronger property since it gives more capabilities to the attacker. In our model, this implication can be formally proved.
Proposition 1: If a protocol satisfies forward privacy (Definition 4) then it also satisfies unlinkability (Definition 3).
Synchronization issues: The definition of forward privacy uses a token to synchronize the interfaces c 1 , c 2 . Similarly to the case of unlinkability, the use of a token is not essential for the definition; a non-synchronized version can be used if we want to be sensitive to synchronization attacks. However, in the case of forward privacy the token is also used to block the two interfaces after breaking a tag and revealing its state to the adversary. Thus, a nonsynchronized version is technically more involved, it is not sufficient to merely remove all occurrences of t. We briefly sketch here how this could be achieved: the idea is to use two tokens t 1 , t 2 , one for each interface. Since each interface has its own token, there is no actual synchronization between them. Then, the Break sub-process can consume both tokens t 1 , t 2 , effectively blocking the two interfaces, before revealing the state to the attacker.
IV. FRAME INDEPENDENCE
In this section we discuss a notion that we call frame independence. As shown later in Section V, this concept can be used to give sufficient and necessary conditions for unlinkability and forward privacy for a generic family of protocols. Nevertheless, the notion itself is generic, hence we develop it on its own, proving some results that will be used later in the paper.
Consider two frames ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , each containing some free names. We provide both frames to the attacker, after restricting those names. The attacker's goal is to decide whether the terms in both frames contain the same restricted names s, or different. If the attacker is able to distinguish the two cases we say that ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 are dependent with respect to s, otherwise they are independent. Intuitively, two frames being dependent means that the attacker can link them to the same owner due to the use of the same restricted names s.
Example 2: Consider the frames
where h is a hash function. Even if s is restricted, we can still decide whether s is the same in both frames or not. Namely, we can apply h to x and then test whether h(x) = E y. However, a shared secret does not always imply a dependence. Consider for example the frames
If s is restricted, and since r is also restricted, it is impossible to tell whether h(s) and h(s, r) contain the same secret s.
We formalize this idea in the following definition: Definition 5: Let ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 be closed frames with dom(ϕ 1 ) ∩ dom(ϕ 2 ) = ∅. We say that ϕ 1 is independent of ϕ 2 with respect to the names s, written
Intuitively, this definition states that ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 are independent with respect to s iff their composition under the same restricted names s is statically equivalent to simply putting them in parallel, each with their own restricted names. The definition is vaguely reminiscent of the independence of probability events, p(A ∧ B) = p(A)p(B), which requires that the joint distribution (in our case composition with shared names) is obtained by simply multiplying the marginal distributions (in our case putting in parallel the two frames).
Going back to our previous examples, we have that
On the other hand
/ y } as expected. We now state some basic properties of frame independence.
Proposition 2: Let ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , ψ be closed frames such that ϕ 1 ⊥ s ψ. If one of the following holds:
The second part of the above proposition says that we can extend a frame ϕ 1 while preserving independence. An extended frame ϕ 2 adds new terms to the ones exported by ϕ 1 , but these terms can be constructed from ϕ 1 . The new terms can contain restricted names of ϕ 1 , but only if they are contained in some term already present in ϕ 1 . For example,
/ y } Reciprocally, the third part says that we can restrict ϕ 1 to a subset of the exported terms, while preserving independence. Moreover, we can restrict some free names of ϕ 1 , provided that they are not free in ψ, and still preserve independence.
A. Independence of hash functions
One-way hash functions are commonly used in RFID protocols. Indeed, both protocols analyzed in this paper use solely hash functions as cryptographic primitive. In this section we give some results concerning the independence of frames using hash functions.
In the applied pi calculus, hash functions are typically modelled by a unary function symbol h with no equational axioms. Still, hash functions can be combined with other cryptographic primitives with their own axioms, so we might end up with an equational theory with an arbitrary set of axioms, the only condition being that they should not contain h. To use this fact in proofs, we should find properties of hash functions that hold under any such theory. In fact, seeking even more generality, we can pose the question of what it means for the function symbol h to be a hash function in an arbitrary equational theory = E , independently from how = E is generated. We begin by giving such a definition which will then be used in proofs involving hash functions.
We fix an equational theory = E , let M, K, L be terms and let h be a unary function. We define M [
replaces exact occurrences of h(K).
Definition 6: We say that a unary function h is a one-way hash function with respect to
for all terms K, L, M and variables x.
The idea behind this definition is that h(M ) can appear in an equation K = E L only as a "generic term", the equation should not depend on the fact that h(M ) is a hashed value. Thus, we require that replacing all occurrences of h(M ) by a variable x gives us an equation that is still valid in = E . For example, assuming that h is a hash function, the equation
is allowed, provided that dec(enc(x, k), k) = E x holds in general. On the other hand, the equation
violates Definition 6 (unless g is the constant function g(x) = E m).
The following lemma shows that hash functions behave as expected.
Lemma 1: Let h be a hash function (Definition 6) and assume that = E does not equate all terms. Then
there is no equation that inverts h, i.e. there is no function invh such that invh(h(x)) = E x. 4) there is no equation that checks a hashed value, i.e. checkh(M ) = E ok iff M = E h(M ). Definition 6 can be thought as a generalization to arbitrary equational theories of the traditional definition of hash functions (a function symbol with no axioms). For axiomatic theories, the two definitions are (almost) equivalent. It can be shown that a theory defined by a finite set of axioms that do not contain h satisfies the definition. Conversely, an axiomatic theory satisfying Definition 6 might contain axioms involving h. However, replacing h(M ) by x in these axioms, we obtain an equivalent theory defined by a finite set of axioms not containing h.
It should also be noted that Definition 6 is in fact too strong, forbidding some equations that do hold for real hash functions. For example, if g is a hash function, then h(x) = g(g(x)) is also a hash function, yet the above equation violates Definition 6. This problem, however, is also true for the traditional definition of hash functions, and can be circumvented by dropping h completely and always using g(g(M )) in place of h(M ).
We are now ready to give a generic result, showing a sufficient condition for the independence of frames containing hashed terms.
Theorem 1: Let h 1 , . . . , h k , g 1 , . . . , g l be hash functions (Definition 6), not necessarily distinct, and let
Note that in the above theorem, the two frames consist only of hashed terms and contain no restricted names. However, these limitations can be overcome using Proposition 2. Going back to Example 2, we can directly use Theorem 1 to show that { h(s)
/ y }, where r is a fixed unrestricted name. Then we can apply Prop 2 to restrict r and show that { h(s)
/ y }.
V. ANALYSIS OF A GENERIC CLASS OF PROTOCOLS
In this section we focus on a class of protocols that we call "single step" identification protocols. The main characteristic of this class is that each protocol session contains a single message sent from the tag to the reader. The tag is first activated by the reader, without however receiving any information. Then, the tag reads its state, constructs a proper message, possibly containing fresh nonces, and sends it to the reader. This message alone should be sufficient for the reader to identify the tag. Finally, the tag updates its state and the session ends. We study this class in full generality giving sufficient and necessary conditions for unlinkability and forward privacy.
Although this class of protocols is quite restricted, it is still of great interest for several reasons. First, the simplicity of single step protocols helps us understand the fundamental properties that are required to ensure privacy, making it easier to understand more complex protocols. Second, as we will see in the next section, two published protocols fall in this class. Moreover, it should be possible to gradually extend this class, adding for example the ability for a tag to receive input from the reader. Finally, having general results for a class of protocols allow us to experiment with protocol design. For example, our results could allow a designer to try a single-step protocol with a new cryptographic primitive, and quickly check whether it satisfies privacy.
We first introduce some notation to simplify the presentation. Let π(x) denote a term containing a single free variable x (possibly with multiple occurrences). We define
which allows us to use function notation, for example
We also write π n (M ) for π(. . . π(M )), n times. A generic single step protocol is shown in Figure 4 . The tag starts with an initial state S 0 , which can be any term containing the tag's secret s. On each execution, π(x) is applied to the current state and the result is sent to the reader. Moreover, the state is updated by applying σ(x) to the current state. The terms π(x), σ(x) can be arbitrary, with π(x) possibly containing restricted names from a set { ρ} (which corresponds to generating fresh nonces). Thus, after i + 1 executions, the state's content is σ i (S 0 ) and the tag's output is π(σ i (S 0 )). Note that an arbitrary signature and equational theory can be used for all of the above terms.
We model single step protocols in the applied pi calculus as described in Section III-A. To properly define a T ag(c) process, we need to instantiate its P (w, c) and InitSt(w, s) sub-processes.
Definition 7: The class of single step protocols consists of all protocols of the form:
for some terms π(x), σ(x), S 0 and channels ρ s.t. s / ∈ f n(π(x)) ∪ f n(σ(x)). InitSt(w, s) simply initializes the state with S 0 . P (w, c) starts with an input on c, which simply triggers the beginning of the session. Then, the tag consumes the synchronization token t and reads its state in x. Afterwards, it generates the nonces ρ and outputs π(x) on the channel c. Finally, it restores the token and updates the state with σ(x). For simplicity, we assume that { ρ} ∩ f n(σ(x)) = ∅, i.e. fresh nonces are only transmitted, not stored in the state.
For this class of protocols, the readers are completely passive, they only trigger the tag without sending any data to it. Since c is a public channel, the tag can be triggered by any process in parallel to it, thus we can completely avoid specifying the reader. So, to complete the instantiation of all processes of an RFID system (Section III-A), we set Reader = DB = 0 and n = ε.
Unlinkability: Clearly not all single step protocols satisfy unlinkability. We start by identifying the possible reasons for violating it. The simplest case is when the i-th and j-th sessions of a tag can be distinguished. The output of the tag's (i + 1)-st session is π(σ i (S 0 )). Consider the extreme case where
. This gives the information to the attacker of how many sessions the protocol has run so far. Now the attacker can simply run a session on c 1 followed by a session on c 2 . If the interfaces correspond to the same tag, the second session will output 2, otherwise it will output 1, allowing the attacker to easily distinguish the two cases.
To simplify the notation we define
is ρ x turns a term into a frame. We then define the following property.
Definition 8: A single-step protocol satisfies P 1 iff
Intuitively, P 1 requires that the tag's output on different sessions is indistinguishable. This prevents the simple attack discussed above but is still not sufficient for unlinkability. Consider another extreme case where
. This satisfies P 1 since the output does not depend on i. However unlinkability is clearly violated since the tag's secret is sent in cleartext.
Running two sessions on c 1 , c 2 the attacker will get s 1 , s 2 if the interfaces correspond to different tags, otherwise s, s.
Protecting the secret with a hash, i.e. π(σ i (S 0 )) = h(s) does not help either. Running two sessions on c 1 , c 2 will give h(s 1 ), h(s 2 ) in the first case and h(s), h(s) in the second, which can be also distinguished. Indeed, it is clear that if the output on every session is constant, unlinkability will always be violated. But even a variable output is no guarantee: consider a single step protocol with
Running two sessions on c 1 , c 2 will give x 1 = h(s 1 ), x 2 = h(s 2 ) in the case of two independent tags and x 1 = h(s), x 2 = h 2 (s) in the case of a single tag. By checking h(x 1 ) = x 2 the attacker can distinguish once again the two cases.
The common problem behind these attacks is that the output of two different sessions can be linked through the use of the common name s. The solution lies exactly in the notion of frame independence, which brings us to the definition of the property P 2 .
Definition 9: A single-step protocol satisfies P 2 iff
Intuitively P 2 requires that the tag's output in the first n sessions is independent from the output of the n + 1-st session, with respect to the tag's secret s.
Note that P 1 and P 2 are incomparable: the first extreme case, π(σ i (S 0 )) = i, satisfies P 2 but not P 1 while the second extreme case π(σ i (S 0 )) = s satisfies P 1 but not P 2 . There are two inherently different flaws of π(σ i (S 0 )) that the attacker can exploit: a dependency on i and a dependency on s. P 1 disallows the first while P 2 disallows the second. Together they capture unlinkability for single step protocols.
Theorem 2: A single step protocol satisfies unlinkability (Definition 3) if and only if it satisfies P 1 and P 2 . The complete proof is given in the report version of this paper ( [2] ). The main part is to show that P 1 , P 2 are sufficient for unlinkability, we only sketch the main idea here. Note that, since the reader and the backend database are not modelled explicitly, Definition 3 is greatly simplified. It is sufficient to show that
, as we can add ReplT ag using the congruence of ≈. The dynamics of these processes is simple and both are able to perform the same transitions. The challenging part of the proof is to show that the produced frames are statically equivalent. Assume that n sessions are run on c 1 and m sessions on c 2 . Then C[T ag(c 1 , c 2 )] will produce νs.
n+m−1 i=0
since both interfaces are connected to the same tag. Using P 2 we can show that this is statically equivalent to
that is, to the same output performed by n + m separate tags. Now we can use P 1 to freely change the exponents of σ, and we get
Finally, we can use P 2 again to "join" the tags, and obtain:
which is exactly the frame produced by C[T ag(c 1 ) | T ag(c 2 )], consisting of n outputs of T ag(c 1 ) and m outputs of T ag(c 2 ).
It is worth noting that for uniformity we use the synchronized definition of unlinkability (Definition 3) everywhere in the paper. This also makes the proof of Theorem 3 slightly easier. However, for single step protocols this is not strictly necessary. The reason is that a single step protocol, after reading its state, immediately updates it with a new value. As a consequence, a new session can always be started, thus the synchronization attack described in Section III-B cannot succeed. Technically, we can remove the use of the token t, and define a single step protocol as:
With a slight modification of the proof, it can be shown that Theorem 3 holds for the above definition. Note that the output c π(x) is in parallel to the updated state St (w, σ(x) ). This models the fact that a tag asynchronously transmits its output and updates the state without waiting for the reader. This is crucial to satisfy untreaceability without synchronization, as it ensures that a session on interface c 1 will never block a session on c 2 , even if the two interfaces share the same state.
Forward privacy: For forward privacy we need to strengthen our conditions, since the adversary now has an extra capability, namely to reveal the state of a tag. The attacker might try to link the state to the output of another tag, so we have to ensure that the state is independent from all previous output. This brings us to the property P 3 .
Definition 10: A single step protocol satisfies P 3 iff
/ y } ∀n ∈ N P 3 is similar to P 2 , but instead of requiring that the (n + 1)-st output is independent from the first n, it requires that the contents of the state after the n-th session is independent from the first n outputs. In fact, this is strictly stronger. Proposition 3: For all single step protocols, property P 3 implies P 2 . We can now state the corresponding result for forward privacy.
Theorem 3: A single step protocol satisfies forward privacy (Definition 4) if and only if it satisfies P 1 and P 3 . The proof is similar to the one for unlinkability. Note that the above theorem together with Prop. 3 shows that forward privacy implies unlinkability for single step protocols, which was already expected from Prop. 1.
The advantage of the sufficient and necessary conditions given in this section (Theorems 2,3), with respect to the general definitions of Section III-B, is their simplicity which makes them easier to verify. Indeed, these conditions involve only static equivalences between messages and not the full dynamics of the protocol. In the next section we use these conditions to verify two protocols from the literature, manually in the general case and mechanically for a bounded number of sessions. This task is much more challenging using the general definitions.
VI. CASE STUDIES
In this section we apply the results for single step protocols to two existing ones from the literature. The first is the OSK protocol ( [1] ), already discussed in the introduction and formalized in Section III-A. We also discuss some variations of the protocol, where we weaken some of its aspects to examine how privacy is affected. Finally we analyze a basic hash protocol of [13] , which falls in the same class even though it is quite different in spirit than the OSK protocol.
A. The OSK protocol
In the OSK protocol ( [1] ), displayed in Figure 1 , tags can compute two distinct hash functions g, h. The state of each tag is initialized with a randomly generated secret which is also known to the backend. On each run, the tag computes the hash g of its current state and sends it to the reader. Then it computes the hash h of its current state, and updates the state with the result. As a consequence, the output of the i-th run of a tag is g(h i−1 (s)) where s is the initial secret. The backend knows the secret of all tags, so it can compute g(h i−1 (s)) for all secrets and thus identify the tag. For efficiency, the backend can precompute the expected output for the next run of all tags, and perform a fast search during identification. Once the tag is identified, its expected output can be updated.
The OSK protocol can be modelled as a single-step protocol (Definition 7) with:
Thus, proving forward privacy for OSK reduces to proving the properties P 1 , P 3 . Proposition 4: The OSK protocol satisfies properties P 1 , P 3 , namely:
The challenging proof is the one of P 3 which follows from Theorem 1, since for all i < n no subterm of g(h i (s)) is equal to h n (s) and vice versa. Then by Theorem 3 we conclude that OSK satisfies forward privacy (and as a consequence also unlinkability).
Proof mechanization: Static equivalence between applied pi calculus processes can be proved automatically in many cases using the ProVerif tool ( [14] ). Note, however, that proving P 1 , P 3 involves proving an infinite number of static equivalences. For P 1 we can overcome this problem by constructing a pair of dynamic processes that can produce all pairs of messages, and then use ProVerif to prove all static equivalences at once. On the other hand, this is not possible for P 2 . Still, each one of the static equivalences of P 2 can be proved automatically by ProVerif. Proving these equivalences up to a fixed n corresponds to proving forward privacy up to a fixed number of tag sessions. We used ProVerif successfully to prove these equivalences for up to 1000 sessions, which only took a few minutes. On the other hand, even though ProVerif is capable of automatically proving observational equivalence ( [15] ), this capability is limited to very simple cases where the processes to be proved equivalent are almost identical. Equivalences like the one of our general definition of forward privacy (Definition 4) are outside the tool's current abilities.
So our conditions for unlinkability and forward privacy did not yield a complete mechanization for OSK. Still, it can be argued that extending ProVerif (or building new techniques) to deal with property P 2 should be easier than to deal with Definitions 3, 4. Moreover, ProVerif translates applied pi calculus processes to horn clauses which effectively causes them to be replicated. Thus, there is no direct way of using ProVerif to prove our general definitions of unlinkability even for a bounded number of sessions (which we achieved for OSK). Moreover, our conditions allow us to manually prove forward privacy for OSK for an unbounded number of sessions, which is challenging using the general definition.
Weak OSK protocol: We might ask the question of whether both hash functions of OSK are needed. We examine here the effects of relaxing the conditions on h, g. First consider the case where h is not one-way, that is there exists a function invh and an equation invh(h(x)) = E x. Intuitively, this breaks forward privacy since from h n (s) the attacker can compute s which can be then used to link past sessions to the tag. Indeed, Theorem 1 can be no longer applied to h n (s) and property P 3 is violated. On the other hand, if h(x) = x + 1, an invertible function, then property P 2 is still satisfied: Theorem 1 can be applied to show that
/ xn } Thus the protocol satisfies only unlinkability. On the other hand, if the inverse of g exists then both properties are violated. In this case, given two outputs g(h i (s)) and g(h j (s)) with i < j, the adversary can first extract h i (s) and h j (s). Then, since h is a public hash function, she can apply it j − i times to the first value: if it coincides with the second the adversary can conclude that the outputs belong to the same tag. Indeed, both properties P 2 , P 3 are violated (even though P 1 is still satisfied).
B. Basic hash protocol of [13]
The basic hash protocol of [13] is also a single-step protocol, although quite different in spirit than the OSK protocol. It uses a random number generator and a hash function h. The state of each tag is initialized with a randomly generated secret, known to the backend, and is never updated. Instead, on each run a tag generates a fresh nonce r and computes the hash h(s, r) of its secret together with r. Finally it outputs the pair (r, h(s, r)). The backend computes h(s, r) for all known tags, and compares it with the given value to identify the tag.
This basic hash protocol has essential differences wrt the OSK protocol: it never updates the tag's state and it generates a random nonce at each execution. However, it can be also modelled as a single-step protocol (Definition 7) with:
As a consequence, we can prove unlinkability by proving the properties P 1 , P 2 . Proposition 5: The simple hash protocol satisfies properties P 1 , P 2 , namely
/ xn }, ∀n ∈ N P 1 follows trivially from the reflexivity of ≈ s . For P 2 we can use Theorem 1 together with Prop. 2. Thus, by Theorem 2, we conclude that the protocol satisfies unlinkability. Similarly to the OSK protocol, each one of the infinite equivalences of P 2 can be proved by ProVerif, so we can have an automated proof of unlinkability for any bounded number of sessions.
On the other hand, forward privacy is intuitively violated. Tampering with the tag the attacker obtains s which can be then used to link any previous session. Indeed, P 3 is clearly not satisfied.
VII. RELATED AND FUTURE WORK
Related work: Several papers ( [9] , [1] , [10] , [16] , [11] , [17] , [18] ) analyze privacy properties for RFID systems, in various levels of formality. Most of them, however, define privacy in a computational setting, typically in terms of games. Our work, on the other hand, takes place in a symbolic setting using the formal language of the applied pi calculus. In Section III we briefly describe two types of indistinguishability games found in the literature and explain that the spirit of our definition is comparable to them. The advantage of using a symbolic model is the clarity of the models and definitions that a formal language provides, the rigour of the proofs and the possibility of automatic verification using tools like ProVerif ( [14] ). On the other hand, a symbolic analysis might miss attacks that exploit weaknesses of the cryptographic primitives, which is important for RFID system that often use ad-hoc crypto that is often found to be insecure.
The work that is closest to ours is the one of Arapinis et al., who independently developed a definition of untraceability in the applied pi calculus. In their recently published paper ( [7] ), they define the properties of strong and weak untraceability. The former is a strong property requiring that the RFID system is equivalent to one where each tag executes only one session. This is possible because in their model the attacker cannot choose which tag to communicate with, instead she might get a response from any tag. However, the ability to query a tag several times, knowing that it is the same tag that replies each time, is very common to RFID systems. If the attacker obtains proximity to a tag, she can perform multiple queries within a very short time and be almost certain that the same tag replies. Adding this ability to a model makes it impossible to satisfy this definition, as it is trivial to distinguish a tag that can only execute a single session.
Weak untraceability, the second definition of [7] , requires a system where a particular tag executes two sessions to be equivalent to a system where one of these two sessions is replaced by one belonging to a different tag. Our definition instead requires a system with a tag executing infinitely many sessions to be equivalent to a system where there are two tags executing the same steps. In general, [7] provides interesting alternatives to our definitions, hence we plan to investigate their relation in the near future. Note also that [7] , being a short paper, only states the definitions. Our work provides several results that are outside its scope: for example the definition of forward privacy, showing that it is stronger than unlinkability, providing conditions for single step protocols and the analysis of two identification protocols from the literature. Note also that a longer paper by the same authors ( [19] ) will appear at CSF 2010 (together with the present paper). The definition of weak untraceability has been substantially altered in this paper.
Deursen et al. ([6] ) also define untraceability in a symbolic setting. This work differs from ours because their model and definitions are based on traces, which are a set of actions performed by the system. While our work provides a specific framework to model RFID systems, this approach does not take into account any RFID features, defining untraceability in terms of abstract traces. More importantly, the definition of Deursen et al. is inherently weaker. It forbids the attacker from knowing that two sessions are linked, i.e. executed by the same tag, but when two sessions are not linked, it does not prevent the attacker from knowing this fact (as our definition does). This, of course, might not be required depending on the application. With this respect, the definition of [6] is very close to the one of weak untraceability from [19] .
Finally, the works of [20] and [21] use the applied pi calculus and ProVerif to prove properties close in spirit to unlinkability, like untraceability and anonymity, for anonymous credential protocols. Like our work, they provide formal definitions of security properties and show their effectiveness analyzing existing protocols. However, both the context and the properties studied in these works are substantially different from ours: they aim at providing anonymity using zero-knowledge proofs while our work focuses on privacy for RFID protocols.
Future work: There are several directions for future work. In this paper we defined unlinkability, inspired by the second type of games described in Section III. However, untraceability games can be also captured in our framework in an intuitive way. In this game, the attacker is given access to a single tag, chosen among {T 0 , T 1 }, and she needs to decide which one she is communicating with. To capture such a game, we can use two independent tags, with interfaces c 1 , c 2 . Then, a third test interface can be introduced, which is linked to either one of the two tags. This gives the adversary access to one of the two tags, similarly to the untraceability game. Then we can define untraceability as Intuitively, the attacker should not be able to distinguish whether c is linked to the first or the second tag. Defining both untraceability and unlinkability in the same framework allows us to show in an elegant way that unlinkability is stronger. Assuming Definition 3 holds, we can split T ag(c 1 , c) in two tags: We plan to study this property in more detail in the near future.
Furthermore, defining the notion of self-stabilizing backwards privacy from [22] is a natural extension of our definition of forward privacy. We also plan to give general results for classes wider than the one of single step protocols, allowing more steps and/or the ability to receive input from the reader. We also aim at automatic verification, using the ProVerif tool (already used in Section VI in a limited setting). Finally, we plan at studying the relation of our work to the definitions of [7] .
